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  Fame, however modest, will open doors and Annette was a specialist in using what she had. It is not difficult to imagine, therefore, Annette obtaining favourable access to, or information from, places or organisations of special interest to her. This is ingrained in the development formula of a near-perfect spy, and the distance Annette needed to travel to complete this process was very short indeed.

  FOOTNOTES

  * * *

  5 Annette’s resourcefulness featured in her undertakings. Here she effectively uses banking terminology she probably acquired while working in the London bank.

  6 Unlike Annette, who committed suicide, Chanel’s money bought silence from those who could expose her links to the Nazis. She obtained protection from prosecution through the influence of ‘friends in high places’, possibly including Winston Churchill .

  5

  A Perfect Spy … Almost

  The Female Spy

  The 30 September 2012 edition of Forbes Magazine included an article titled:

  ONE OF THE CIA’S BEST-KEPT SECRETS

  In the article, an ex-CIA female agent listed reasons why her gender may function in the spy world with several advantages over male counterparts:

  People Skills: Being able to make friends easily, to read people – determine their motivations and vulnerabilities … When we received training about how to ‘spot and assess’ potential sources, it came naturally to the women.

  Street Smart vs Physical Strength: Contrary to popular belief that you need to be physically fit to outmanoeuvre the enemy, it’s actually the ability to read the danger potential of a person or situation … Women are already attuned to the security of their environment. We are always on the lookout for suspicious characters, people who might be following us, dangerous situations. We’ve compensated for being the physically ‘weaker sex’ by developing these street smarts.

  Women have the ‘nurturing instinct’: … Very often you’re dealing with not the most reliable, stable or trustworthy individuals – just like kids – and you must safeguard them against any number of threats.

  Women are better listeners: Many of the men in my training class had to be instructed on how to listen or on how to elicit information. It came naturally to us women.

  To compare the above features to those of the pre-World War II female agent, they need to be translated from the twenty-first century back to the late 1930s. However, it is likely that the intrinsic qualities of the modern spy have changed little from pre-World War II. Technological, training and operational routines have transformed dramatically, but the key principle of what motivates the modern-day espionage operative remains essentially unchanged.

  One shortcoming experienced by the World War II female spy was in the vital area of communications. Transporting heavy radio and processing equipment was obviously more suited to a man, but this was probably a small offset against other and often more appropriate qualities a woman could offer.

  A female spy will normally project a greater mystique than a male. When characteristics such as honesty and trustworthiness are applied to men and women, the latter usually score more highly. Unfairly or otherwise, when a female politician lies to the people, it usually carries a greater public criticism than may have been expected if the politician were a male. From this, and other individual traits, popular culture has ensured a disproportional degree of intrigue is attached to the female spy. It is commonly perceived to be more difficult for women to play the dishonest role.

  Ultimate Credentials

  What are the desired qualities of an ideal spy? It’s a straightforward question so we just need to look at the basics. Let’s ignore Hollywood’s definitions and images gleaned from James Bond and John Le Carre and focus on the central factors. These are:

  Security within the operating environment. A good spy’s primary responsibility is not to be caught. This may sound elementary, but to an espionage service, an active spy in its employ is both an investment and a potential risk. It is imperative that sufficient work and resources are injected into the program of ensuring that the planned ‘work’ area is secure. This means suitable training for the spy and his or her contacts. Remaining above suspicion is paramount, and the ability of a spy to read the danger of exposure is more than simply having an advantage – it could be life saving.

  Information collection. A good spy obtains facts and data deemed useful by the agency for which the spy operates. Working tirelessly in a target territory and doing so above suspicion is of little value if useful information cannot be obtained. Not forwarding evidence of activity may raise suspicions from the agency that the spy in the field is either slack or has, voluntarily or involuntarily, committed the ultimate betrayal by changing sides.

  Information transmission. The gathering of significant material is worthless while it remains with the spy. It needs to be delivered to the right people. But meetings may be monitored, telephones tapped, radio transmissions traced, codes broken and letters intercepted. Therefore, complete safety in transmission will require strict rules.

  A spy’s expertise in neutralising sudden adversity. Events likely to create suspicion of a spy need to be addressed with speed and conviction. Mistakes may occur, or coincidental incidents could place the spy in a compromising setting. The ability to confidently and hastily defuse a problematic situation may never be necessary, but if needed, it could be the best protection obtainable.

  Motivation. Why does an individual agree to risk the hazards inherent to the murky world of espionage? One reason is money, or the receipt of some tangible benefit. Personal revenge, coercion and threats, or the general dislike for the target country may be other reasons. But in the 1930s the most reliable force was a simple desire to serve one’s country, or a powerful conviction favouring support of someone else’s country. The gauging of motivation is critical in a spy assessment process. Where an applicant’s enthusiasm is misjudged, the danger of an agent ‘rolling over’ to the enemy may become a lethal reality.

  So, an ideal spy will be an individual confidently living in the target community, positioned to collect valuable data and to successfully move this data to its point of transfer, capable of diverting suspicion from sudden adverse circumstances and inspired in the work by the opportunity to serve their country or another country to which they have been converted.

  There are other factors, but without all of the above, the ‘returns’ a spy’s endeavours may generate will be at a risk that could miscarry a critical strategy against an enemy.

  The Defector – the Spy’s Enemy Below

  Like everything else in an imperfect world, a flawless spy has never existed. Human shortcomings and a vast range of unforeseen circumstances have always guaranteed that espionage work is never without risk, and trust is never complete. In addition to operational risks, the spy constantly lives with the possibility of betrayal – a colleague who ‘turns’ and exposes the spy’s cover to the enemy. This prospect is not limited to other spies and their controllers. An example was Heinrich Cordes.

  Heinrich Cordes was born in Germany in 1912 and joined the Nazi party in 1933. He was later elevated through the SS to serve on German merchant ships as the Nazi political officer. In September 1937 he deserted his ship in Sydney and later commenced a small business producing liquid soap in the Sydney suburb of Five Dock. On the outbreak of World War II he unsuccessfully offered to provide information on Nazi activities in Australia to avoid internment. He did, however, offer assistance during his custody. His name is mentioned in Annette’s file as a possible source of information on her activities, but what he offered, if anything, is unknown. His case, however, is an example of the unpredictable and uncontrollable risks incurred by spies who may otherwise have established an unsuspecting record within the target community.

  There are other means by which a spy’s successful cover may be exposed, including carelessness. Annette Wagner’s associations with the hard-core Nazis in Sydney were seemingly very few, and only with t
hose who Military Intelligence had reason to be concerned about. One of these was Rudolph Durkop, mentioned in a Military Intelligence memo dated 1 December 1939, following his internment:

  Further to this office M.I.S. 1342 of 27 October 1939, Navy7 now advise that the papers of Durkop referring to ‘the French girl Wagner’ were taken by the Police Squad in a raid on the night of third/fourth September …

  Australia joined Britain in declaring war on Germany on 3 September, hence the raid on the active Nazi Durkop – Nazi party member 2599504 – and others that evening. How Annette’s name appeared in Durkop’s possession is not known, but it may be reasoned the two were together for at least one common interest. Durkop’s de facto, Helene Franze, entered in her diary for 5 April 1939 a visit to the cinema with four others. One of the four was recorded as ‘Wagner’. There is no certainty this was Annette; however, the name did not appear in her earlier diary entries for 1938 and 1939 listing friends and acquaintances. It is therefore highly feasible that this was, indeed, Annette.

  As Nazis, Durkop and Franze were fanatics. It is likely their entire spare time was filled with any opportunity to further the cause – and to do anything they were ordered. Annette’s association with them, no matter how infrequent, would have been with this knowledge.

  Occasionally, however, conditions will exist that provide for a reduction of risk for the spy. One of these ‘natural’ advantages is the individual prepared to spy on behalf of a foreign government, and is already securely in place prior to a declaration of war. The threat of exposure, as detailed above, remains, but the usual ‘spy initiations’ required to avoid suspicion are dispensed with. One of the ‘initiations’ dealt with is the obtaining of permanent residency in the target country.

  The ‘home-grown’ spy has immediate advantages over the spy ‘imported’. Language, cultural issues, employment and general community knowledge in his or her area of operations do not present the difficulties that may challenge new arrivals. The prime problem for the spy’s controllers is reliability. At what point will a citizen, living and working in the country of birth, decide to ‘switch back’ and spill everything to authorities in that country?

  There are also possibilities resulting from migration. A German who migrated, for example, to the United States during the 1930s did so for a reason, and probably a good reason. To convert the migrant to spying for Germany would require a positive result in the ‘conversion’ formula. This would consist of providing an incentive to the prospective spy that would be greater than the sum of (1) the purpose of migration, plus (2) the risk of being caught. Espionage operations carry risks unlike any others and the fate of a captured spy is governed by both an absence of official assistance for that individual and the potential benefit, or otherwise, to the captors.

  Most espionage objectives carry different techniques to accommodate the huge variety of likely obstacles existing in intelligence goals. Annette Wagner adapted her undercover persona extremely well, and it is very likely that had the lingering effects of typhoid fever resulted in her being bed-ridden one day in late October 1938, she may well have eluded suspicion entirely.

  Naturally, any foreign agency planting a spy into another nation would employ a process enabling that spy to effectively study and develop a familiarity with the host nation’s history and social, cultural and political traits – i.e. the training designed to ensure the spy’s true status and intentions remain below the opposition’s identification horizon. This should provide groundwork for determining the suitability of individuals for the foreign intelligence assignment. Not everyone is capable of devoting time and personal resources into an enemy society and then appearing to be supportive of it.

  Annette Wagner was a professional. Her instinctive capabilities were suitably reinforced by above-average intelligence, and her extensive travels had embedded in her behaviour a combination of worldly knowledge, the economic and social conditions of the day, and an entrenched sense of caution. Annette’s spy-training regime is unknown, but commencing long before she arrived in Australia she had been principally, and unintentionally, self-taught.

  All processes have a beginning, and the assessment of what produces a competent undercover agent commences with providing a valid reason for residing in the target country. Without this, ground-level suspicion has a head start.

  Annette Wagner – The Spy Who Came in from the Heat

  Annette arrived in Australia suitably prepared, having a second cousin living in a small community about two hours’ drive north of Sydney. She told authorities in Australia she had contracted typhoid fever while living in Madagascar. Following six months in hospital, she was offered a return to France in January 1938, but Australia in summer was her preferred recovery option to France in winter. She asserted that the illness resulted from her work in assisting with health services to the local population, for which she was awarded a decoration by the French government.

  Her stated objective in coming to Australia was to catch up with her cousin and medically recuperate. For a foreign resident security rating, this would attract a high score. Her reason was clear, understandable, and supported by the presence of relatives. The only gremlin in her admission into Australia was in her customs declaration when arriving in Fremantle. Annette advised her estimated period of residency in Australia would be six weeks. This may have passed unnoticed by Security, or, perhaps it may have been explained by a simple change of plans and a more permanent residency was applied for in the normal manner.

  Annette’s Security Test – A Comfortable Pass

  Annette’s search for employment, when it finally commenced, may have called for a security assessment – either formal or informal. Swiss-born, a French citizen, married to a French civil servant and her formative years spent in England all added up to a politically harmless background. The only potential glitch was her German-speaking father, but that was in Switzerland, and at the time Annette arrived in Australia, Hitler was talking peace to the world.

  Hitler’s manoeuvres in Europe may have created mixed responses, but the real national security anxieties in Australia in 1938 were focused in one direction only – north – to the Japanese aggression in China, the extensive build-up of the Japanese navy, well in excess of defensive requirements, and the new commercially based Japanese spy operations in Southeast Asia and the South West Pacific. A European arrival in Australia, depending on origin and political circumstances, may have attracted some security attention, but the greatest potential menace was closer to home.

  Add to Annette’s background some personal charm and clever conversation when necessary, plus a few relapses from her admirably acquired typhoid fever, and the result in any security assessment is likely to have been a solid pass. She did not present any distinguishing features that would cause security alarm bells to ring.

  So Annette entered comfortably into the country of interest, but how did she rate with the Germans as a potentially reliable spy?

  In this evaluation, there are considerable gaps in our understanding of the lady. These gaps are the result of, firstly, the secret nature of espionage and, secondly, Annette’s capacity to be very good at what she was ordained to do. A sloppy spy may leave openings as to methods and trails of evidence, but a crafty spy, careful with operations, contacts and communications, may leave signs of evidence so minuscule they are almost non-detectible. So it was with Annette Wagner. Her exposure as a spy did not begin with suspicious behaviour from her operations – she was not ‘traced’ or entrapped. She was monitored by Military Intelligence, and it was only through intense observation, by various means, that the cracks in her deception came to light.

  The German assessment of Annette would have included the same process conducted by Australian authorities, had there been one, but in reverse. Obviously, the Germans were satisfied with the results they obtained with whatever tests were applied. But this also introduces a further question we cannot answer. Was Annette sourced and trained by a German intel
ligence agency before she arrived in Australia, or did her Nazi contacts in Australia do so after she arrived in March 1938? There is a distinct possibility that Annette arrived in Australia with the intentions she described, and nothing more. This unknown may be extended to include the possibility that Annette’s trip to Australia had not been arranged directly by a German intelligence branch. Perhaps she arrived on ‘recommendation’ from an unknown source. We will never know.

  There is yet another possibility – that Annette’s entry into radio broadcasting may have signalled her usefulness for dispatching coded messages via the most effective, and safest, form of secret communication available at that time. It is possible the Nazi spy network in Australia in 1938 made contact with Annette following the awareness of both the radio potential and her arrival from Madagascar where the administration had pro-Nazi leanings. Unfortunately, the records offering the answer to the question of Annette’s arrangement with Axis spying were probably destroyed prior to, or immediately following, the German surrender in May 1945.

  The Assimilation Project – Annette’s Star Performance

  Successful players in the espionage game endeavour to assimilate into a target community at a level devoid of suspicion. Spies need to blend in. ‘Differences’ need to be removed as far as possible as variations from the ‘normal’ may initiate doubts, justified or not, that could lead to mistrust. In an era of international stress and suspicion, too many ‘differences’ may result in official enquiries and an unwelcome intrusion into the spy’s private world. Taking this further, an active rather than reclusive role in the community social scene will undoubtedly produce acquaintances capable of offering support should this be useful. Solid target community connections may be the best form of insurance available to a spy.